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577 
STAGED CERCLA REMEDIATION VS. 
BIOGEOCHEMICAL CYCLING: HOW THE 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT COMPARTMENTALIZED THE 
ENVIRONMENT IN FREY v. EPA, AND WHY 
POLYCHLORINATED BIPHENYLS DON’T CARE 
JOE LANCE* 
Abstract: For decades, toxic chemicals have leaked from disposed electronic 
equipment into the environment at several sites around Bloomington, Indiana. 
The contamination has resulted in a series of lawsuits concerning when citi-
zens may bring legal claims in order to have input in the cleanup process. The 
Seventh Circuit, in Frey v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, held that 
section 113(h)(4) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act, or CERCLA, bars review of the EPA’s planned or 
pending stages of an environmental cleanup. The court held, however, that 
CERCLA allows review of completed stages of a cleanup as long as they are 
not directly related to the EPA’s new remediation plans. This Comment argues 
that although the decision is a sensible legal compromise, it ignores the estab-
lished scientific concept of biogeochemical cycling: matter is not static, it 
moves throughout the many compartments of Earth’s surface. The Seventh 
Circuit’s decision ignores this scientific truth and instead creates illusory dis-
tinctions between environmental compartments in order to satisfy a legal rule. 
Although the decision ignores the process of biogeochemical cycling, it none-
theless creates a predictable precedent. Additionally, this Comment argues that 
the Seventh Circuit’s decision will not have a practical impact on the remedia-
tion of the Bloomington, Indiana sites, or any other CERCLA cleanup sites in 
the court’s jurisdiction, because the EPA’s remediation plans, which account 
for biogeochemical cycling, will continue unaffected. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1979, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) banned the manu-
facture, distribution, use, and storage of polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”), 
a carcinogenic chemical that is harmful to humans and animals.1 For Rich-
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2014–2015. 
 1 40 C.F.R. § 761.20 (1979); Frey v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Frey III), 751 F.3d 461, 463 (7th 
Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 494 (2014); Josephine Borja et al., Polychlorinated Biphenyls and 
Their Biodegradation, 40 PROCESS BIOCHEMISTRY 1999, 2001 (2005); Michael Schroeder, Did 
Westinghouse Keep Mum on Pc Bs?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 11, 1991), http://www.
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ard K. Sluder and other residents of Bloomington, Indiana, however, that 
was too late.2 Mr. Sluder claims his severe arthritis and memory loss were 
caused by PCB exposure while working for Westinghouse Electric Corpora-
tion—now known as Columbia Broadcasting System (“CBS”).3 Mr. Slud-
er’s blood test results revealed a PCB concentration of 3450 parts per bil-
lion—the highest concentration ever found in a human.4 Beyond the walls 
of its local facilities, CBS exposed the community to PCBs by discharging 
the chemical at six dumpsites in and around Bloomington.5 In fact, Bloom-
ington had the largest volume of PCBs—650,000 cubic yards of landfill 
soil—anywhere in the United States.6 
PCBs have many disastrous environmental and health effects.7 They 
have been linked to ailments including rare liver cancers, malignant mela-
noma, a rare skin disease called chloracne, and clinical hepatitis.8 Beyond 
humans, “[PCBs] can affect the productivity of phytoplankton and the com-
position of phytoplankton communities.”9 These tiny creatures, at the bot-
tom of the food chain, are the primary source of oxygen to the atmos-
phere.10 Further, PCBs are transferred through the food chain from phyto-
plankton to invertebrates, fish, and mammals, including humans.11 
Bloomington is situated upon limestone karst and dissolved soluble 
rocks rife with fissures, cracks, and pores.12 Groundwater containing PCBs 
filters through the pores of the limestone karst and soluble rocks and ultimate-
ly saturates the sediment below the surface.13 Once the groundwater, the 
karst, and the rocks are polluted, environmental cleanup is extremely diffi-
cult.14 
                                                                                                                           
businessweek.com/stories/1991-08-11/did-westinghouse-keep-mum-on-pc-bs, archived at http://
perma.cc/UXB2-3WSZ. 
 2 Schroeder, supra note 1. 
 3 Id.; Geraldine Fabrikant, CBS Accepts Bid by Westinghouse; $5.4 Billion Deal, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 2, 1995, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/02/business/cbs-accepts-bid-
by-westinghouse-5.4-billion-deal.html?pagewanted=1, archived at http://perma.cc/MLC5-YT4U. 
 4 Schroeder, supra note 1. 
 5 See Frey v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 937 F. Supp. 2d 964, 966 (D. Ind. 2013), aff’d, 751 
F.3d 461 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 6 Schroeder, supra note 1. 
 7 See 40 C.F.R. § 761.20 (1979); Frey III, 751 F.3d at 463; Borja et al., supra note 1, at 2001. 
 8 Borja et al., supra note 1, at 2001. Other PCB-related ailments include body weight loss, 
headaches, dizziness, depression, nervousness, fatigue, and impaired reproduction. Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 What Are Phytoplankton?, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://oceanservice.
noaa.gov/facts/phyto.html (last updated Apr. 29, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/Q6YY-URZL. 
 11 Borja et al., supra note 1, at 2001. 
 12 Frey III, 751 F.3d at 464; United States v. CBS Corp., No. 1:81-cv-448-RLY-KPF, 2009 
WL 2230889, at *2 (D. Ind. July 23, 2009); Schroeder, supra note 1. 
 13 See Frey, 937 F. Supp. 2d at 967. 
 14 Frey III, 751 F.3d at 464. 
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Such environmental cleanup efforts are often conducted in stages.15 A 
stage might focus on a particular pollutant, a polluted environmental com-
partment, or a polluted area.16 Although a staged remediation approach pur-
ports to clean polluted sites in a linear, systematic way, biogeochemical cy-
cling—the transfer of particles between environmental compartments—
makes it difficult to tell where one polluted compartment begins and another 
ends, and thus makes it difficult to achieve discrete, linear stages of cleanup.17 
In 2014, in Frey v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided that section 113(h)(4) of 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act (“CERCLA”) bars review of the EPA’s planned or pending stages of an 
environmental cleanup, but allows review of completed stages as long as 
they are not directly related to the EPA’s new remediation plans.18 This 
Comment argues that the Seventh Circuit made a satisfactory legal com-
promise because, despite largely ignoring the scientific process of biogeo-
chemical cycling, it will not undermine the ultimate goal: total remediation 
of the contaminated Bloomington sites.19 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
From 1958 until 1972, CBS manufactured electric capacitors insulated 
with fluid composed of PCBs in a Bloomington, Indiana facility.20 During 
this period, CBS dumped defective capacitors into landfills in and around 
Bloomington, where PCBs then leaked out from the capacitors and into the 
environment.21 PCB contamination originating from the CBS manufactur-
                                                                                                                           
 15 ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND 
SOCIETY 725–28 (4th ed. 2010); see Frey III, 751 F.3d at 467. 
 16 See Frey III, 751 F.3d at 468; PLATER ET AL., supra note 15, at 725–28 and accompanying 
text. 
 17 See ROY M. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING OUR ENVIRONMENT: AN INTRODUCTION TO EN-
VIRONMENTAL CHEMISTRY AND POLLUTION 237–39 (3rd ed. 1999). The physical states of pollutants 
(e.g., gas to liquid) and location (e.g., landfill to groundwater) shift. Id. This shifting complicates 
remediation because pinpointing pollutants and polluted areas and physically distinguishing them can 
be very difficult. See id. 
 18 See 751 F.3d at 467–68. 
 19 See infra notes 96–123 and accompanying text (this Comment does not argue that it will 
effectuate that goal or that it will not—merely that it will not undermine that goal); see also HAR-
RISON, supra note 17, at 237–39 (explaining the scientific reason underlying the fundamental flaw 
in the court’s opinion). 
 20 Frey III, 751 F.3d at 463; Frey, 937 F. Supp. 2d at 966. Electric capacitors store electric ener-
gy. Robert Worth, Legacy of Poison in Twice-Excavated Yards, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2001, at B5, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/12/nyregion/legacy-of-poison-in-twice-excavated-
yards.html, archived at http://perma.cc/Z4YU-2L9T. Historically, CBS used PCBs to insulate the 
electric capacitors. Id. 
 21 Frey III, 751 F.3d at 463 (“CBS also discharged PCB-laden water from its plant to a local 
sewage treatment plant.”). 
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ing facility was discovered in the soil, streams, plants, and wildlife sur-
rounding Bloomington in the late 1970s.22 To force CBS to remediate six 
sites contaminated with PCBs, the U.S. Government, the State of Indiana, 
Monroe County, and the City of Bloomington filed enforcement actions 
under CERCLA.23 A 1985 consent decree mandated that CBS excavate con-
taminated materials in six affected sites and to destroy the materials in an 
incinerator.24 The solution outlined in the consent decree was tabled, how-
ever, after the Indiana legislature blocked construction of the incinerator 
due to public opposition.25 
The EPA, the State of Indiana, the Indiana Department of Environmen-
tal Management, the City of Bloomington, the Bloomington Utilities Ser-
vice Board, Monroe County, and CBS (the “parties”), eventually agreed to 
modify the cleanup plans at three of the six contaminated sites: Anderson 
Road Landfill, Winston-Thomas Plant, and Neal’s Dump.26 They were una-
ble to reach an agreement for the other three sites: Lemon Lane Landfill, 
Neal’s Landfill, and Bennett’s Dump.27 Absent a comprehensive plan to 
clean the three disputed sites, the parties worked together to commence 
cleanup efforts in stages.28 Staged cleanup allowed CBS to begin cleaning 
up the three sites while the parties negotiated other aspects of remediation.29 
The extended and intermittent negotiations eventually resulted in an 
agreement for a three-staged cleanup process.30 Each stage was outlined in 
                                                                                                                           
 22 Frey, 937 F. Supp. 2d at 966. 
 23 Frey III, 751 F.3d. at 463. A judicial enforcement action is a lawsuit filed to compel a party to 
“comply with statutory or regulatory requirements, with an administrative order, or who owe [the] 
EPA response costs for cleaning up a superfund site.” Enforcement Basic Information, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/enforcement/enforcement-basic-information (last updated Jan. 
15, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/M6VY-P8L5. 
 24 Frey v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Frey I), 270 F.3d 1129, 1130 (7th Cir. 2001); Frey, 937 
F. Supp. 2d at 966. A consent decree is an agreement between parties to settle a dispute without an 
admission of guilt. Consent Decree Definition, FREEDICTIONARY.COM, http://legal-dictionary.the
freedictionary.com/consent+decree (last visited Jan. 22, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/PHR3-
GPUJ. The six Bloomington area sites involved in the cleanup were (1) Anderson Road Landfill, 
(2) Winston-Thomas Plant, (3) Neal’s Dump, (4) Lemon Lane Landfill, (5) Neal’s Landfill, and 
(6) Bennett’s Dump. Frey, 937 F. Supp. 2d at 966. 
 25 RONALD A. HITES & JONATHAN D. RAFF, ELEMENTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CHEMISTRY 
(2d ed. 2012). The incinerator fell victim to the “Not in my Backyard” phenomenon: Bloomington 
residents, weary of the incinerator being built in their community, convinced Indiana legislators to 
pass a series of laws that blocked its construction. Id. 
 26 Frey, 937 F. Supp. 2d at 967. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Frey III, 751 F.3d at 464. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. Bloomington’s geology, featuring limestone karst, makes total remediation difficult, 
which necessitates additional remediation stages. See id. at 464; supra notes 12–17 and accompa-
nying text. Stage 1 required CBS to extract PCB-contaminated sediment from Lemon Lane Land-
fill and Neal’s Landfill, to clean all sediment at Bennett’s Dump, and to construct a “landfill cap” 
at all three sites to halt the spread of contaminated sediment. Frey III, 751 F.3d at 464. Stages 2 
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several Records of Decision published by the EPA.31 In “Stage 1,” CBS tar-
geted PCB contamination at the three landfills by removing, cleaning, and 
capping contaminated sediment.32 After Stage 1 concluded in 2000, howev-
er, PCBs were found to be continually seeping from the bedrock into the 
groundwater and sediment, despite the completion of the cleanup stage.33 
In 2006, after the parties agreed to the terms of “Stage 2” and “Stage 
3” of the CERCLA cleanup, remediation of the three sites recommenced, 
targeting ongoing and future contamination of groundwater and sediment.34 
According to the agreements, CBS was required to operate water treatment 
systems at Lemon Lane Landfill, Neal’s Landfill, and Bennett’s Dump.35 
CBS was also required to test the water at the sites periodically until the 
concentration of PCBs was equal to or below EPA limits for one year.36 
Stage 2 and Stage 3 remediation efforts were ongoing as of May 2014.37 
The plaintiffs in Frey v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Frey 
III)—activists who believe the EPA’s current plan does not comply with 
federal or state law—previously brought this citizen suit under CERCLA in 
2000, and again in 2004, to halt CBS’s remediation efforts.38 The U.S. Dis-
                                                                                                                           
and 3 are ongoing and require CBS to “operate a water treatment plant at Lemon Lane Landfill,” 
“operate a groundwater collection and treatment system at Neal’s landfill,” and operate a new 
drainage system, water treatment plant, and collection trench at Bennett’s Dump. Id. 
 31 Frey I, 270 F.3d at 1134. A Record of Decision is “a public document that explains which 
cleanup alternatives will be used to clean up a Superfund site.” Record of Decision, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/cleanup/rod.htm (last updated Aug. 9, 2011), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/KP83-EJAU. 
 32 Frey III, 751 F.3d at 464. In Stage 1, CBS was required to remove highly contaminated 
sediment from Lemon Lane Landfill and Neal’s Landfill, clean all sediment at Bennett’s dump to 
“industrial standards,” and contain any remaining contaminated sediment with a clay landfill cap 
at all three sites. Id. 
 33 Id. Bedrock is the solid rock underlying loose deposits, like soil. Bedrock, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bedrock (last visited Jan. 22, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/H4XF-6YSR. The diffusion of pollutant materials from the bedrock is 
not surprising because pollutant materials shift between environmental compartments. See HARRI-
SON, supra note 17, at 237. 
 34 Frey III, 751 F.3d at 464. 
 35 Id. CBS was also tasked with developing a drain and water treatment system at Bennett’s 
Dump. Id. 
 36 Id. “Effluent guidelines are national standards, based on the performance of treatment and 
control technologies, for wastewater discharges to surface waters and municipal sewage treatment 
plants.” Effluent Limitation Guidelines, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/scitech/
wastetech/guide/index.cfm (last updated Apr. 15, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/SH5D-SDQC. 
 37 Frey III, 751 F.3d at 464. As of January 30, 2015, construction related to Stages 2 and 3 
had been completed at Neal’s Landfill and Lemon Lane Landfill, while construction related to 
Stages 2 and 3 at Bennett’s Dump is ongoing. Telephone Interview with Jeff Cahn, Associate 
Regional Counsel, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Jan. 30, 2015). As of January 30, 2015, maintenance 
work associated with Stages 2 and 3, such as checking equipment and testing water, is ongoing at 
all three sites. Id. 
 38 Frey III, 751 F.3d at 465; see Frey v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Frey II), 403 F.3d 828 (7th 
Cir. 2005) (reversing the district court holding that the EPA was in between stages of the Bloom-
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trict Court for the Southern District of Indiana dismissed both previous iter-
ations of the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction—holding that sec-
tion 113(h)(4) of CERCLA barred the suits.39 On appeal, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed both decisions, holding that the dis-
trict court had subject matter jurisdiction because supposed future remedial 
action at the sites was not sufficiently definite to trigger section 113(h)(4).40 
In 2009, in Frey III, the plaintiffs brought their suit for a third time.41 
Their complaint alleged that the EPA did not complete the CERCLA man-
dated remedial investigation and feasibility study (“RI/FS”), or an equiva-
lent study, before selecting Stages 1, 2, and 3.42 Additionally, the plaintiffs 
argued Stages 1, 2, and 3 violated CERCLA’s mandate that the EPA protect 
human health and the environment.43 
The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims relating to Stages 2 
and 3 because work on those stages was ongoing, thus triggering section 
113(h)(4) of CERCLA.44 In light of the Seventh Circuit’s holdings in the 
two previous dispositions of Frey v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(Frey I and Frey II), however, the court allowed the plaintiff’s claim chal-
lenging Stage 1.45 The district court reasoned that because the EPA’s plans 
were not sufficiently concrete and certain by the time Stage 1 was complete, 
Stages 2 and 3 were not sufficiently related to Stage 1 for the court to con-
sider them a continuation of the same remediation plan.46 It thus decided 
that although section 113(h)(4) barred review of Stages 2 and 3 of the re-
mediation for the contaminated sites, Stage 1 was reviewable because it was 
completed and not directly related to the EPA’s new remediation plans.47 
The plaintiffs appealed the district courts decision to the Seventh Circuit, 
arguing that CERCLA’s bar on judicial review does not apply to their claims 
                                                                                                                           
ington cleanup, thereby permitting citizen suits under CERCLA); Frey I, 270 F.3d at 1130 (revers-
ing the district court holding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because CERCLA 
only bars citizen suits when remediation is incomplete). 
 39 Frey, 937 F. Supp. 2d at 965; see Frey III, 751 F.3d at 465. CERCLA section 113(h)(4) 
bars citizen suits “where a remedial action is to be undertaken at the site.” Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(4) (2012). 
 40 Frey II, 403 F.3d at 835–36; Frey I, 270 F.3d at 1134–35. 
 41 Frey III, 751 F.3d at 465 (noting that the plaintiffs filed the Third Amended Complaint). 
 42 Id. “This regulatory process requires [the] EPA to develop a list of effective remedial alter-
natives and to assess their feasibility.” Frey II, 403 F.3d at 830. 
 43 Frey III, 751 F.3d at 465. 
 44 Id.; see infra notes 65–84 and accompanying text (identifying the context in which section 
113(h)(4) applies). 
 45 Frey III, 751 F.3d at 465; Frey II, 403 F.3d at 828; Frey I, 270 F.3d at 1130. The court 
granted summary judgment for the EPA on all Stage 1 related claims because the equivalent of an 
RI/FS had been completed, and the remedies protected human health and the environment. Frey 
III, 751 F.3d at 465. 
 46 Frey III, 751 F.3d at 468. 
 47 Id. at 468–69. 
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challenging Stages 2 or 3.48 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit was faced with an 
issue of first impression: whether the district court was correct in concluding 
that section 113(h)(4) did not bar the plaintiff’s citizen suit challenging Stage 
1 because it was not sufficiently related to Stages 2 and 3.49 
In May, 2014, in Frey III, the Seventh Circuit upheld the district 
court’s determination that section 113(h)(4) barred review of Stages 2 and 3 
because the stages were sufficiently underway, but that Stage 1—completed 
at the time of the case—was reviewable because it was not directly related 
to the EPA’s remediation plans in Stages 2 and 3.50 In reaching its decision, 
the court identified three possible solutions to resolve the issue.51 
The first possible solution was that section 113(h)(4) could be con-
strued to bar review of completed remediation as soon as new plans at the 
site are selected by the EPA and sufficiently definite.52 The court rejected 
this interpretation, as it would constitute a “silent prohibition” on citizen 
suits.53 The second possible solution would permit judicial review of prior 
actions regardless of new remediation stages proposed by the EPA.54 If a 
newly proposed stage is similar to, or arises out of, the previous stage, then 
the court could not review the new stage without effectively reviewing the 
previous stage.55 Thus, any overlapping stages, the court reasoned, would 
certainly violate section 113(h)(4)’s ban on reviewing ongoing remedial 
action.56 
                                                                                                                           
 48 Id. at 466–68. 
 49 Id. at 468. 
 50 Id. at 468–69. The court further made three extraneous holdings in the decision. See id. at 
463. First, the citizens were not entitled to attorney fees because they were not the prevailing par-
ty. Id. at 471. Second, recusal of the judge was improper because the judge’s previous rulings on 
similar issues stemmed, in part, from the fact that the citizens had introduced the recurring argu-
ments. Id. at 472. Moreover, the court explained that judges commonly rule on familiar factors 
without developing bias or antagonism towards the parties or arguments. Id. Third, the EPA satis-
fied its duty under CERCLA in completing the functional equivalent of a RI/FS because the EPA 
thought Stage 1 was an important step, but not enough, in combating PCB pollution at the sites. 
Id. at 470–71. 
 51 Id. at 468. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. By allowing the EPA to quash review, this approach would effectively nullify section 
113(h)(4) because the EPA would be able to eliminate citizen suits indefinitely by proposing small 
future remediation stages whenever a citizen suit arises. Id.; see Frey I, 270 F.3d at 1134 (“One 
can always imagine some future action especially, in the area of environmental regulation, but the 
time limits in § 113(h) are geared to concrete, existing, remedial measures; not measures that 
might be devised at some future date.”). Moreover, this interpretation could result in citizen suits 
being undermined by new remediation plans after plaintiffs have spent considerable time and 
resources pursuing the claims. See Frey III, 751 F.3d at 468. 
 54 Frey III, 751 F.3d at 468. 
 55 Id. 
 56 See id. 
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In the absence of dispositive case law or guidance from CERCLA, the 
Seventh Circuit settled on a third, middle ground option.57 It held that a new 
remediation plan does not bar a citizen suit pursuant to section 113(h)(4) if 
the old plan is not related to the new plan.58 Further, the court held that over-
lapping portions of stages are barred from review.59 To illustrate the meaning 
of related in this context, the court explained that plans dealing with a differ-
ent pollutant, area, or polluted compartment would be sufficiently different to 
allow review of the initial plan.60 Pursuant to this approach, the court held 
that because Stage 1 was completed at the time of filing, and because it dealt 
with different issues than the new remediation plans in Stages 2 and 3, it was 
subject to judicial review, whereas review of Stages 2 and 3—which remain 
ongoing today—is barred by section 113(h)(4).61 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. CERCLA 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”) is a federal statute that facilitates the cleanup 
and remediation of pollution.62 CERCLA authorizes the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) to conduct removal or remedial action when contami-
nants pose a threat to the public health or welfare or to the environment.63 In 
addition to enabling direct action, CERCLA allows the EPA to compel the 
party responsible for the pollution to conduct the removal and remedial ac-
tion.64 
To prevent stalling or derailing remedial efforts, Congress constrained 
judicial review of citizen suits challenging the EPA’s cleanup actions.65 Sec-
tion 113(h)(4) of CERCLA bars federal courts from “review[ing] any chal-
lenges to removal or remedial action selected [by the EPA] . . . where a reme-
                                                                                                                           
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 See id. at 469. 
 62 Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1092 (7th Cir. 1990); see Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2012) (CERCLA sections are 
commonly used to reference the statute in lieu of the corresponding section of the U.S. Code). 
 63 42 U.S.C. § 9604; Schalk, 900 F.2d at 1097 (reaffirming federal courts’ inability to hear 
citizen suits regarding incomplete remedial actions). “Removal” refers to a stopgap remedy to 
address immediate risks posed by pollution, whereas “remedial” refers to long-term, permanent 
remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23)–(24). 
 64 Schalk, 900 F.2d at 1092. 
 65 Alabama v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 871 F.2d 1548, 1560 (11th Cir. 1989); see 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9613(h); Frey v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Frey II), 403 F.3d 828, 836 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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dial action is to be undertaken at the site.”66 This bar on citizen suits lasts 
from the time the EPA selects a remedial action to the time the action is com-
plete.67 When a remedial action involves several stages, section 113(h)(4) 
bars a citizen suit until the final stage is complete.68 
Federal courts rely on section 113(h)(4)’s plain language in determin-
ing that they lack subject matter jurisdiction under CERCLA until the re-
medial action is complete.69 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit, in Alabama v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, held that be-
cause section 113(h)(4) is written in the past tense, Congress was referring 
to acts that happened in the past.70 It thus found that citizen suits are not 
permitted until after remedial action is complete.71 Similarly, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in Cannon v. Gates, interpreted the lan-
guage in section 113(h)(4) broadly, holding that Congress aimed to “strip” 
judicial authority to review cases interfering with an ongoing cleanup.72 
A remedial plan is legally complete when all stages of the selected 
remedy have been fully executed.73 The continued existence of concrete 
and definite future remedial stages of a plan, to be executed, thus bars citi-
zen suits, whereas distant and hypothetical future remedial actions that 
might become part of a cleanup are considered distinct and do not trigger 
section 113(h)(4).74 To determine whether or not a planned remedial stage 
triggers section 113(h)(4), courts look for evidence that sufficiently concrete 
and definite future work is planned.75 A Record of Decision is a sufficient—
though unnecessary—objective referent; a less formal indicator could be 
enough to indicate the presence of sufficiently concrete and definite future 
work.76 
                                                                                                                           
 66 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). 
 67 See Schalk, 900 F.2d at 1095. 
 68 Frey v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Frey I), 270 F.3d 1129, 1134 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 69 Alabama, 871 F.2d at 1557. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that they did not have jurisdic-
tion over claims brought in a citizen suit contesting placement of a toxic waste disposal site be-
cause no citizen suit can be brought until a remedial action is completed. Id. at 1560. House con-
ference reports show notes indicating that the legislature wanted judicial review of remediation ac-
tions off the table until stages of those actions are complete. Id. at 1557; see, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 99-
962, at 224 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 3317. 
 72 538 F.3d 1328, 1336 (10th Cir. 2008). The Tenth Circuit upheld a jurisdictional bar on 
citizens’ claims challenging the Department of the Army’s disposal of toxic chemicals because the 
Army’s monitoring of the situation amounted to an “ongoing remedial action” for the purposes of 
CERCLA. See id. at 1330–36. 
 73 Frey I, 270 F.3d at 1134; N. Shore Gas Co. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 930 F.2d 1239, 
1244 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 74 See Frey I, 270 F.3d at 1134. 
 75 See Frey II, 403 F.3d at 834–35. 
 76 Id. at 835. 
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In 2001, in Frey v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Frey I), the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that that section 
113(h)(4) bars citizen suits when remedial action is to be done, even if a 
previous stage is complete.77 The court relied on section 113(h)(4)’s plain 
language, referring to Congress’ use of “remedial action” instead of “a re-
medial action,” or “stage of a remedial action.”78 The court implied that if 
Congress intended to define a completed stage as completed remedial ac-
tion, it would have done so.79 
In 2005, in Frey v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Frey II), the 
Seventh Circuit held that the EPA could not point to concrete evidence that 
indicated future remediation was sufficiently definite at three Bloomington, 
Indiana cleanup sites: Lemon Lane Landfill; Neal’s Landfill; and Bennett’s 
Dump.80 Therefore, the court held that according to its holding in Frey I, 
Stage 1, which was complete, was ripe for judicial review despite the pend-
ing future work to be done in Stages 2 and 3.81 
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia came to a different 
qualitative conclusion than the Seventh Circuit.82 In Anacostia Riverkeeper 
v. Washington Gas Light Co., private organizations pursued a citizen suit to 
enjoin a gas company’s remedial efforts near the Anacostia River in Wash-
ington, D.C.83 The court held that indefinite but imminent remediation plans 
at a site where cleanup efforts had ceased still triggered section 113(h)(4) 
because the EPA was “moving ahead diligently.”84 
B. Judicial Responsibility to Understand Scientific Issues;  
Biogeochemical Cycling 
Federal trial judges are evidentiary gatekeepers and are expected to be 
scientifically literate in cases with scientific evidentiary issues.85 This gate-
keeping role includes the responsibility to determine the admissibility of 
                                                                                                                           
 77 Frey I, 270 F.3d at 1134. 
 78 Id. 
 79 See id. 
 80 Frey II, 403 F.3d. at 828, 834–36. 
 81 See id. at 834–36 (finding that because the EPA could not show concrete and definite plans 
for future remediation, the work done at the time of the case was ripe for judicial review). 
 82 Anacostia Riverkeeper v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 892 F. Supp. 2d 161, 164 (D. D.C. 2012). 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 172. The holding in Anacostia Riverkeeper was inconsistent with the Seventh Cir-
cuit’s decision in Frey II. Compare id. (allowing indefinite future remediation plans to trigger the 
section 113(h)(4) bar on citizen suits), with Frey II, 403 F.3d at 834–36 (requiring concrete evi-
dence of future remediation plans to trigger the section 113(h)(4) bar on citizen suits). 
 85 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993); Adam J. Siegel, Note, 
Setting Limits on Judicial Scientific, Technical, and Other Specialized Fact-Finding in the New 
Millennium, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 167, 169–71 (2000). 
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expert witness testimony relating to scientific matters.86 Although the nexus 
of science and law can be complex, the Supreme Court, in Daubert v. Mer-
rell Dow Pharmaceuticals, directed federal judges to embrace relevant and 
reliable scientific evidence in their courtrooms.87 Though judges are not 
expected to master all facets of science, they are expected to be proficient in 
scientific language and methodology.88 Pursuant to this expectation, there 
are many resources available to them to simplify scientific concepts.89 For 
example, they may use court-appointed experts, seminars, and their own 
research to help them grasp scientific matters.90 
Scientists have understood and accepted one such concept for decades: 
the process of biogeochemical cycling.91 Biogeochemical cycling is the 
“complex interplay of biological, geological and chemical processes by 
which materials . . . are exchanged and reused at the Earth’s surface.”92 It is 
established that matter—including pollutants—diffuses through environ-
mental compartments, such as from a landfill to the underlying groundwa-
ter, unless it is carefully controlled.93 Thus, according to process of biogeo-
chemical cycling, the judicial definition of when a remedial plan is com-
plete is misleading, and in many cases incorrect.94 As such, although a 
completed remediation might satisfy legal obligations, it could leave a con-
taminated site vulnerable to the reintroduction of the same pollutants target-
ed in the supposedly completed remediation.95  
III. ANALYSIS 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s middle ground ap-
proach, in Frey v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Frey III), in de-
ciding whether section 113(h)(4) of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) blocks citizen suits 
challenging ongoing staged environmental cleanup projects, is a satisfactory 
                                                                                                                           
 86 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589–91; Siegel, supra note 85, at 169. 
 87 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589–90; David L. Faigman, Mapping the Labyrinth of Scientific 
Evidence, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 555, 555–56 (1995). 
 88 Faigman, supra note 87, at 579. 
 89 See Siegel, supra note 85, at 169–71. 
 90 See id. 
 91 See HARRISON, supra note 17, at 237–38; John I. Hedges, Global Biogeochemical Cycles: 
Progress and Problems, 39 MARINE CHEMISTRY 67 (1992) (summarizing a contemporary under-
standing of biogeochemical cycling in the scientific community), available at http://www.ic.ucsc.
edu/~mdmccar/ocea213/readings/discuss_2_Hedges/Hedges_1992_MarChem_global_biogeochem_
cycles_progress_problems.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/NK3K-W5PM. 
 92 See HARRISON, supra note 17, at 237–38. 
 93 See id.; HEDGES, supra note 92, at 67. 
 94 See supra notes 73–76, 92–93 and accompanying text. 
 95 See HARRISON, supra note 17, at 237–38. 
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legal solution to an unfortunate, but inevitable environmental problem.96 By 
forging a middle ground, the court avoided a functional prohibition on judi-
cial review of citizen suits challenging Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) cleanup plans, while also preventing citizen suits from derailing mul-
ti-stage remediation plans before they are completed.97 Further, it is con-
sistent with the court’s holdings in the two prior dispositions of this citizen 
suit.98 By allowing citizen suits challenging finished remedial stages that 
are sufficiently unrelated to ongoing stages, the court forged a necessary 
and functional legal compromise.99 
The middle ground approach promotes predictable future judicial re-
sults, but it does so at the risk of ignoring scientific facts.100 Although the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision is legally satisfactory, it relies on the false prem-
ise that pollutants remain static between environmental compartments.101 
The court’s decision rests on a literal presumption about the scientific na-
ture of environmental compartments that is at odds with the well-accepted 
concept of biogeochemical cycling.102 That concept holds that pollutants 
will move between environmental compartments even after a compartment 
has been cleaned in a remediation stage. 103 
Courts and regulators will find it easier to accept Frey III’s environ-
mental compartmentalization than will scientists and environmentalists fa-
miliar with pollution and biogeochemical cycling.104 Due to the topograph-
ical nature of the Bloomington sites, and more specifically, the potential 
recontamination of environmental compartments with polychlorinated bi-
phenyls (“PCBs”) that were thought to have been removed, biogeochemical 
cycling suggests that all stages of the CERCLA mandated cleanup at the 
                                                                                                                           
 96 See Frey v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Frey III), 751 F.3d 461, 468 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. 
denied, 135 S. Ct. 494 (2014); see also J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Rehnquist Court at Twilight: 
The Lures and Perils of Split-the-Difference Jurisprudence, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1969, 1995 (2006) 
(evaluating the merits of “split-the-difference” jurisprudence). 
 97 See Frey III, 751 F.3d at 468. 
 98 See Frey v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Frey II), 403 F.3d 828, 836 (7th Cir. 2005) (the sec-
ond of the two converse holdings Frey III reconciles); Frey v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Frey I), 
270 F.3d 1129, 1134 (7th Cir. 2001) (the first of the two converse holdings Frey III reconciles); 
supra notes 41–61 and accompanying text. 
 99 See Frey III, 751 F.3d at 468; Wilkinson, supra note 96, at 1977. To determining whether 
an ongoing remedial stage is distinct from finished remedial stage, experts will examine the tar-
geted polluted compartment, the pollutant, or the area. See Frey III, 751 F.3d at 468. 
 100 See Frey III, 751 F.3d at 468; supra notes 85–95 and accompanying text. 
 101 See supra notes 85–95 and accompanying text (explaining the pervasively accepted scien-
tific concept of biogeochemical cycling and why it supports the conclusion that all remedial stages 
are inherently connected); infra notes 103–123 and accompanying text. 
 102 See supra notes 85–95 and accompanying text. 
 103 See supra notes 85–95 and accompanying text. 
 104 See Frey III, 751 F.3d at 469; Timothy L. Amsden, Assembling Your State Groundwater 
Protection Strategy, 35 U. KAN. L. REV. 335, 336 (1987). 
2015] Staged CERCLA Remediation vs. Biogeochemical Cycling 589 
sites are physically related.105 The Seventh Circuit even acknowledged that 
its compromise is likely better in theory than in practice.106 Environmental 
laws and regulations are set forth independently of each other and are often 
impractically compartmentalized.107 This compartmentalization ignores the 
tried and true environmental cliché that the environment is an “intercon-
nected web of groundwater, surface water, air, and soil.”108 Pollutants pre-
sent in one environmental compartment will likely enter others.109 Many 
pollutants—including the PCBs contaminating the Bloomington sites—
degrade slowly and move between environmental compartments.110 
Although judges might find understanding biogeochemical cycling to 
be daunting and illusive, they are expected to be scientifically literate.111 
Had the Seventh Circuit explored biogeochemical cycling, it would have 
found that the concept complicates its decision in Frey III.112 Cleanup stag-
es that focus on specific parts of the environment (e.g., groundwater or sed-
iment), like those remediating the dumpsites in Bloomington, might not be 
effective if pollution can leak into areas that have already been cleaned.113 
Remediation is therefore difficult with a stage-based approach unless stages 
run concurrently to account for and limit recontamination.114 
Similar to the Seventh Circuit’s admission that its decision in Frey III 
might be better in theory than in practice, those responsible for cleaning up 
the Bloomington sites acknowledge that PCB pollution crosses environmen-
tal compartments, and thus that the completed Stage 1 of the remediation 
was not entirely effective.115 The EPA project manager at the Bloomington 
sites explained that the cleanup will continue for “dozens and dozens” of 
years because “nobody” knows when or how PCBs might diffuse from the 
karst bedrock into the water supply.116 
Although the courts are likely to continue drawing illusory distinctions 
between environmental compartments and stages of cleanups, the EPA will 
                                                                                                                           
 105 See supra notes 85–95 and infra notes 111–123 and accompanying text. 
 106 Frey III, 751 F.3d at 469. 
 107 See Amsden, supra note 104, at 336. 
 108 Id.; see HARRISON, supra note 17, at 237–39. 
 109 See HARRISON, supra note 17, at 237–39. 
 110 See id. 
 111 Siegel, supra note 85, at 169–71. 
 112 See 751 F.3d at 469; HARRISON, supra note 17, at 237–39; Amsden, supra note 104, at 
336. 
 113 See HARRISON, supra note 17, at 237–39; Amsden, supra note 104, at 336. 
 114 See HARRISON, supra note 17, at 237–39. 
 115 See generally Sehvilla Mann, How Toxic PCBs Are Contaminating Bloomington’s Ground-
water, IND. PUB. MEDIA (Dec. 19, 2013), http://indianapublicmedia.org/news/bloomington-pcb-
cleanup-dozen-60249/, archived at http://perma.cc/W5NT-SW68 (surveying the remaining PCB 
contamination at the Bloomington area cleanup sites). 
 116 See id. 
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continue to build equipment to attempt to clean sites that are supposedly 
remediated by a finished stage, if in reality, it knows the site is still contam-
inated.117 For example, the EPA built a water treatment facility in Blooming-
ton that has cleaned 1.5 billion gallons of PCB-contaminated water in the last 
fourteen years.118 The Seventh Circuit’s decision to proceed with its middle 
ground approach, despite its questionable scientific foundation, should not, 
therefore, have a substantial negative environmental impact; the EPA recog-
nizes that completed stages in a remediation plan do not necessarily consti-
tute a remediated Bloomington.119 
As such, the Seventh Circuit, with its decision in Frey III, did what it 
set out to do: provide a playbook by which future courts and parties can 
determine when consecutive stages of a CERCLA cleanup are sufficiently 
different to permit citizen suits challenging them.120 Although the rationale 
behind the approach is not grounded in perfect science, the remediation in 
Bloomington will continue unchanged.121 The EPA and CBS will continue 
to diligently clean the sites according to the remediation plan while ac-
counting for biogeochemical cycling, which will continue to make their job 
more difficult by ensuring the constant movement and seepage of PCBs, 
and consequently, the re-pollution of completed stages.122 The Frey III deci-
sion, even if it acknowledged and incorporated biogeochemical cycling, 
was never going to change that practical reality.123  
CONCLUSION 
Columbia Broadcast System’s disposal of electronics that were leaking 
carcinogenic pollutants at dumpsites near Bloomington, Indiana has caused a 
half-century’s worth of environmental degradation and legal headaches. The 
company’s and the EPA’s multi-staged attempts at remediating the sites have 
been challenged in multiple citizen suits as insufficient under the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, or CERCLA. 
In Frey v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Frey III)—the third citizen 
suit brought to challenge CBS’s remediation plans for the Bloomington 
sites—the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined that, 
consistent with its holdings in the previous two citizen suits, Stages 2 and 3 of 
                                                                                                                           
 117 See Frey III, 751 F.3d at 468; HARRISON, supra note 17, at 237; Mann, supra note 115. 
 118 See Frey III, 751 F.3d at 468; HARRISON, supra note 17, at 237; Mann, supra note 115. 
Despite this progress, fish in surrounding creeks will be too contaminated for human consumption 
for years to come. Mann, supra note 115. 
 119 See Mann, supra note 115. 
 120 See Frey III, 751 F.3d at 468. 
 121 See id. at 466–68; supra notes 85–95 and accompanying text. 
 122 See Frey III, 751 F.3d at 468; supra notes 85–95 and accompanying text. 
 123 See Frey III, 751 F.3d at 468; supra notes 85–95 and accompanying text. 
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site cleanups, which are currently on-going, are distinct from Stage 1, which 
has been completed. The court reasoned that the later stages were sufficiently 
unrelated to Stage 1, and thus that a citizen suit challenging Stage 1, but only 
Stage 1, was subject to judicial review. 
The court’s middle ground distinction of environmental compartments is 
a legally practical solution to the question of when different stages of a clean-
up are sufficiently related to trigger section 113(h)(4) of CERCLA, which 
bars judicial review of ongoing environmental cleanups. The approach is, 
however, grounded in questionable scientific fact. The interconnectedness of 
the environment—recognized in the widely accepted concept of biogeochem-
ical cycling—makes it difficult to delineate definitively remediated environ-
mental compartments in a cleanup stage, because polluted compartments ex-
change contaminants through biogeochemical cycling. Although the court’s 
decision in Frey III ignores this fact, the success of the EPA’s remediation 
plans will not be impacted. PCBs will continue to cycle through the environ-
mental compartments at the Bloomington sites, and despite the decision, the 
EPA and CBS will work hard to contain and remove them. 
 
 
 
